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Abstract In this paper, we show that it is possible and,
indeed, feasible to use secure multiparty computation (SMC)
for calculating the probability of a collision between two
satellites. For this purpose, we first describe basic floating
point arithmetic operators (addition and multiplication) for
multiparty computations. The operators are implemented on
theSharemindSMCengine.Wediscuss the implementation
details, provide methods for evaluating example elementary
functions (inverse, square root, exponentiation of e, error
function). Using these primitives, we implement a satellite
conjunction analysis algorithm and give benchmark results
for the primitives as well as the conjunction analysis itself.
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1 Introduction
The Earth is orbited by nearly 7,000 spacecraft,1 orbital
debris larger than 10cm are routinely tracked and their num-
ber exceeds 21,000.2 It is understandable that countries do
not want to reveal orbital information about their more strate-
gic satellites. On the other hand, satellites are a big invest-
ment, and it is in every satellite owner’s interest to keep their
property intact.Currently, approximate information about the
whereabouts and orbits of satellites is available. These data
can be analyzed to predict collisions and hopefully react to
the more critical results.
However, in 2009, two communications satellites belong-
ing to the US and Russia collided in orbit [23]. Based on the
publicly available orbital information, the satellites were not
supposed to come closer than half a kilometer to each other
at the of the collision. As there are many orbital objects and
satellite operators, an all-to-all collaboration between par-
ties is infeasible. However, public data are precise enough
to perform a prefilter and exclude all pairs of objects that
cannot collide at least within a given period of time (e.g., the
next 24h). Once the satellite pairs with a sufficiently high
collision risk have been found, the satellite operators should
exchange more detailed information and determine if a colli-
sion is imminent and decide if the trajectory of either object
should be modified. This is similar to today’s process, where
the Space Data Center performs collision predictions on 300
satellite pairs twice a day [16].
We show that secure multiparty computation (SMC) can
be used as a possible solution for this problem. We propose
1 NSSDC Master Catalog, NASA. http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/,
last accessed May 16, 2013.
2 Orbital Debris Program Office, NASA. http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.
gov/faqs.html, last accessed May 16, 2013.
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a secure method that several satellite operators can jointly
use for determining if the orbital objects operated by them
will collide with each other. SMC allows satellite operators
to secret share data about their satellites so that no party can
see the individual values, but collision analysis can still be
conducted. The solution provides cryptographic guarantees
for the confidentiality of the input trajectories.
To be able to implement the collision analysis algorithm
in a privacy-preserving way, we first provide floating point
arithmetic for general multiparty computations and present
an implementation of floating point operations in an SMC
setting based on secret sharing. We build the basic arithmetic
primitives (addition and multiplication), develop example
elementary functions (inverse, square root, exponentiation
of e, error function), and present benchmarks for the imple-
mentations. As a concrete instantiation of the underlying
SMC engine, we have chosen Sharemind [7], as it pro-
vides both excellent performance and convenient develop-
ment tools [17]. However, all the algorithms developed are
applicable for general SMC platforms in which the neces-
sary technical routines are implemented. Using these avail-
able resources,we finally implemented one possible collision
probability computation algorithm, and we give the bench-
mark results for this implementation.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Secure multiparty computation
In this subsection, we give an overview of SMC.
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) with n parties
P1, . . . , Pn is defined as the computation of a function
f (x1, . . . , xn) = (y1, . . . , yn) so that the result is correct
and the input values of all the parties are kept private. Every
party Pi will provide an input value xi and learn only the
result value yi . For some functions f and some input val-
ues, it might be possible to deduce other parties’ inputs from
the result, but in the case of data aggregation algorithms, it
is generally not possible to learn the inputs of other parties
from the result.
In this paper, we concentrate on SMC methods based
on secret sharing—also called share computing techniques.
Share computing uses secret sharing for the storage of data.
Definition 1 Let s be the secret value. An algorithm S
defines a k-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme, if it
computes S(s) = (s1, . . . , sn), and the following conditions
hold [27]:
1. Correctness: s is uniquely determined by any k shares
from {s1, . . . , sn}, and there exists an algorithm S′ that
efficiently computes s from these k shares.
Fig. 1 The input nodes connect to all SMC nodes and store their data
using secret sharing
2. Privacy: Having access to any k − 1 shares from
{s1, . . . , sn} gives no information about the value of s,
i.e., the probability distribution of k − 1 shares is inde-
pendent of s.
We use [[s]] to denote the shared value, i.e., the tuple
(s1, . . . , sn).
The data storage process with three SMC parties is illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Data are collected from data donors and sent
to the three SMC parties called miners. A data donor dis-
tributes the data into n shares using secret sharing and sends
one share of each value to a single miner. This separation
of nodes into input nodes (donors) and SMC nodes (miners)
is useful, as it does not force every party in the information
system to run SMCprotocols. This reduces the complexity of
participating in the computation and makes the technology
more accessible.
After the data have been stored, the SMC nodes can per-
form computations on the shared data. Notice that none of
the SMC nodes can reconstruct the input values thanks to
the properties of secret sharing. We need to preserve this
security guarantee during computations. This is achieved by
using SMC protocols that specify which messages the SMC
nodes should exchange in order to compute new shares of a
value that corresponds to the result of an operation with the
input data.
Figure 2 shows the overall structure of SMC.Assume, that
the SMC nodes have shares of input values u and v and want
to compute w = u  v for some operation . They run the
SMC protocol for operation  which gives each SMC node
one share of the result valuew. Note that the protocols do not
Fig. 2 The SMC nodes can run SMC protocols to compute useful
results from secret-shared data
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Data user
Miners
Fig. 3 Results are published after the computation is complete
leak information about the input values u and v. For details
and examples on how this can be achieved, see the classical
works on SMC [5,9,13,30].
After computations have beenfinished, the results are pub-
lished to the client of the computation. The SMC nodes send
the shares of the result values to the client node that recon-
structs the real result from the shares, see Fig. 3. Note that it
is important not to publish the results when they could still
leak information about the inputs. The algorithms running
in the SMC nodes must be audited to ensure that they do
not publish private inputs. However, note that even if some
nodes publish their result shares too early, they cannot leak
data unless their number exceeds the threshold k.
Several SMC frameworks have implementations [14,21,
28,29]. While the majority of implementations are research
oriented, it is expected that more practical systems will be
created as the technology matures.
2.2 The Sharemind platform
Sharemind [7] is an implementation of privacy-preserving
computation technology based on SMC. In the most recent
version of Sharemind, the users can choose which underly-
ing SMCmethod suits them best. For each available method,
some basic operations (e.g., addition, multiplication) have
been implemented. More complex operations (e.g., division)
often rely on these basic operations. If the basic operations
are universally composable, it is possible to use them to
implement the complex operations without additional effort.
Knowing this, we can design protocols for these complex
operations without having a specific SMC method in mind.
Hence, the operations can be used with any kind of underly-
ing method as long as it supports the basic operations that we
need for the protocol. Some complex protocols, on the other
hand, require us to know what the underlying schemas are
and must, therefore, be redesigned for each underlying SMC
method.
The default protocol suite in Sharemind relies on the
three-party additive secret sharing scheme working on n-bit
integers, n ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64}, i.e., each value x is split into
three shares x1, x2, x3 so that x1 + x2 + x3 = x mod 2n
and [[x]] = (x1, x2, x3). In this article, this is the underly-
ing scheme we use for testing the protocols and for bench-
marking results. This is also the scheme for which we have
implemented targeted optimizations that are dependent on
the format in which the data are stored.
The default protocol suite of Sharemind has formal secu-
rity proofs in the passive securitymodel allowing one corrupt
miner. This ensures that the security of inputs is guaranteed
as long as the miner servers do not deviate from the proto-
cols and do not disclose the contents of their private database.
The protocols are also proven to be universally composable,
meaning that we can run them sequentially or in parallel
without losing the privacy guarantees. For more details on
the security model of Sharemind, please refer to the PhD
thesis [6]. Note that since then, the primitive protocols of
Sharemind have been updated to be more efficient [8].
3 Collaborative satellite collision probability analysis
3.1 Motivation and state of the art
The first confirmed and well-studied collision between a
satellite and another orbital object was the collision of the
French reconnaissance satellite Cerise with a fragment of an
Ariane rocket body in 1996 [25].
The first accidental collision between two intact satellites
happened on February 10th, 2009 when the US communi-
cations satellite Iridium 33 collided with a decommissioned
Russian communications satellite Kosmos 2251 [23]. The
two orbital planes intersected at a nearly right angle, result-
ing in a collision velocity of more than 11km/s. Not only
did the US lose their working satellite, the collision left two
distinct debris clouds floating in Earth’s orbit. Even though
the number of tracked debris is already high, an even larger
amount is expected in case of a body-to-body hit. Prelimi-
nary assessments indicate that the orbital lifetimes of many
of the debris are likely to be tens of years, and as the debris
gradually form a shell about the Earth, further collisions with
new satellites may happen.
This event was the fourth known accidental collision
between two cataloged objects and producedmore than 1,000
pieces of debris [18]. The previous collisions were between a
spacecraft and a smaller piece of debris and did not produce
more than four pieces of new debris each.
The US Space Surveillance Network (part of the US
Strategic Command) is maintaining a catalog of orbital
objects, like satellites and space debris, since the launch
of early satellites like the Sputnik. Some of the informa-
tion is available on the Space-Track.org3 web page for reg-
istered users. However, publicly available orbital data are
3 Space-Track.org, https://www.space-track.org, last accessedMay 16,
2013.
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often imprecise. For example, an analysis based on the pub-
licly available orbital data determined that the Iridium 33 and
Kosmos 2251 would come no closer to each other than half a
kilometer at the time of the collision. This was not among the
top predicted close approaches for that report nor was it the
top predicted close approach for any of the Iridium satellites
for the coming week [18].
This, however, was not a fault in the analysis software but
rather the quality of the data. As a result of how the orbital
data are generated, they are of low fidelity, and are, therefore,
of limited value during analysis. If more precise data were
acquired directly from satellite operators and governments,
and the collision analysis process were agreed upon, these
kinds of collisions could be avoided [19].
3.2 Underlying math
Algorithm 1 describes how to compute the probability of
collision between two spherical objects and is based on [2,3,
16]. As input, the satellite operators give the velocity vectors
v ∈ R3, covariance matrices C ∈ R3×3, position vectors
p ∈ R3 and radii R ∈ R of two space objects. First, on
line 2, we define an orthogonal coordinate system in terms
of the velocity vectors and their difference. The resulting j-
k plane is called the conjunction plane. We consider space
objects as spheres but as all the uncertainty in the problem is
restricted to the conjunction plane, we can project this sphere
ALGORITHM 1: Collision analysis using public data
Input: Velocity vectors va, vb ∈ R3, covariance matrices
Ca,Cb ∈ R3×3, position vectors pa,pb ∈ R3, radii Ra, Rb ∈ R
Output: Probability p of a collision between the two described
objects a and b
1 Set vr ← vb − va
2 Set i ← vr|vr | , j ← vb×va|vb×va | and k ← i × j
3 Set Q ← [j k]
4 Set C ← QT (Ca + Cb)Q
5 Set (u, v) ← Eigenvectors(C)
6 Set (σ 2x , σ
2
y ) ← Eigenvalues(C)
7 Set σx ←
√
σ 2x and σy ←
√
σ 2y
8 Set u ← u|u| and v ← v|v|






← UTQT (pb − pa)
11 Set R ← Ra + Rb
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onto the conjunction plane (line 4) and treat the problem as
2-dimensional [2].
Next, we diagonalize thematrixC to choose a basis for the
conjunction planewhere the basis vectors are alignedwith the
principal axes of the ellipse (lines 5–9). We go on to project
the center of the hardbody (pb−pa) onto the encounter plane
and then put it in the eigenvector basis (line 10) to gain the
coordinates (xm, ym). Finally, the probability of collision is
computed on line 12 [3].
3.2.1 Vector and matrix operations
To implement the analysis given in Algorithm 1, we need to
compute the unit vector, dot product and the cross product for
vectors of length 3. Furthermore, we need matrix multiplica-
tion for two-dimensional matrices and, also, the computation
of the eigensystem for 2 × 2 symmetric matrices. We only
need to consider the eigensystem calculation for symmetric
2 × 2 matrices, so specializing the general method [22] for
2 dimensions is sufficient for our needs. These operations
require multiplication, addition, division and the computa-
tion of square root.
3.2.2 Computing integrals
In addition to common vector and matrix operations, Algo-
rithm 1 also contains the two-dimensional probability equa-





















where R is the combined radius of the bodies, (xm, ym) is the
center of the hardbody in the encounter plane, and σx and σy
are the lengths of the semi-principle axes. Similarly to the
article [3], we use Simpson’s one-third rule for numerical
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Fig. 4 Privacy-preserving collision analysis using secure multiparty
computation
For further details, see [3]. To compute the collision prob-
ability, we require multiplication, addition, division, square
root, exponentiation of e and the computation of the error
function.
3.3 Privacy-preserving solution using secure multiparty
computation
The locations and orbits of communications satellites are
sensitive information and governments or private compa-
nies might not be willing to reveal these data. One possi-
ble solution is to use a trusted third party who will gather
all the data and perform the analysis. This, however, still
requires the satellite owners to reveal their information to an
outside party. While this could be done within one coun-
try, it is doubtful that different governments are willing
to disclose the orbits of their satellites to a single third
party that is inevitably connected with at least one coun-
try.
We propose using SMC instead of a trusted third party.
Figure 4 describes the general idea of our solution. Firstly,
the satellite operators choose three independent parties as
the data hosts. These organizations will either host the
secure computation system themselves or outsource it to
a secure hosting provider. The hosts must be chosen such
that the probability of collision between them is negligi-
ble. Next, the operators secret share their data and upload
the shares to the three hosts. Collision analysis is per-
formed in collaboration between the tree hosting parties,
and the satellite operators can query the results of the analy-
sis.
We need the entire trajectory of the satellite to compute
the collision probability. So, for example, sharing only the
difference between the publicly available trajectory and the
precise one does not reduce the amount of work we have to
perform, in fact it is likely to increase it as we would need
to combine the imprecise public data with the precise secure
difference and only then start the computation.
4 Secure floating point operations
4.1 Related work
Integer data domains are not well suited for scientific and
engineering computations, where rational and real numbers
allow achieving a much greater precision. Catrina et al. [10–
12] took the first steps in adapting real number arithmetic to
secure multi-party computation by developing secure fixed
point arithmetic and applying it to linear programming. In
2011, Franz and Katzenbeisser [15] proposed a solution for
the implementation of floating point arithmetic for secure
signal processing. However, their approach relies on two-
party computations working over garbled circuits, and they
donot provide the actual implementation nor anybenchmark-
ing results. In 2012, Aliasgari et al. [4] designed and eval-
uated floating point computation techniques and protocols
for square root, logarithm and exponentiation in a standard
linear secret sharing framework.
4.2 Representation of floating point numbers
The most widely used standard for floating point arithmetic
is IEEE 754 [1]. To reach our goal of implementing the arith-
metic, wewill alsomake use ofDonaldKnuth’smore generic
presentation given in Sect. 4.2 of the book [20] and ideas used
in FPGA implementations [24].
The majority of the available approaches split the repre-
sentation of a floating point number N into several parts.
– Radix (base) b (usually 2 or 10).
– Sign s (e.g., having the value 0 or 1 corresponding to
signs plus and minus, respectively).
– Significand f representing the significant digits of N .
This number is assumed to belong to a fixed interval like
[1, 2) or [1/b, 1).
– Exponent e showing the number of places the radix point
of the significand needs to be shifted in order to produce
the number N .
– Bias (excess) q is a fixed number used to make the rep-
resentation of e nonnegative; hence, one would actually
use E such that e = E − q for storing the exponent.
For example, for IEEE 754 double-precision arithmetic,
it is defined that q = 1,023, e ∈ [−1,022, 1,023] and
E ∈ [1, 2,046]. The value E = 0 is reserved for repre-
senting N = 0 and some other very small values. The
value E = 2,047 is reserved for special quantities like
infinity and Not a Number (NaN) occurring as a result of
illegal operations (e.g., 0/0 or
√−1).
Using these notations, we have a generic representation
for floating point numbers
N = (−1)s · f · bE−q .
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The IEEE 754 standard is clearly targeted toward explic-
itly available data, where the computing entity has access
to all the bits of the representation. This allows for several
optimizations, e.g., putting the sign, significand and expo-
nent together into one machine word, or leaving the lead-
ing digit of the significand out of the representation, as it
can be assumed to be 1 and, hence, carries no information.
Before real computations on such numbers can start, a spe-
cial procedure called unpacking is required, accompanied by
its counterpart packing to restore the representation after the
computation is over.
In case of a secret-shared representation; however, access
to the bits is nontrivial and involves a lot of computation
for bit extraction [7,8]. An alternative would be storing the
values shared bitwise, but this would render the underlying
processor arithmetic unusable, and we would need to reim-
plement all the basic arithmetic operations on these shares.At
this point, we do not rule this possibility out completely, but
this approach needs good justification before actual imple-
mentation.
In order to save time on bit extraction in the course of
packing and unpacking, we will store the crucial parts of the
floating point numbers (sign, significand and exponent) in
separately shared values s, e and f that have 8, 16 and 32
bits, respectively. We also allow double-precision floating
point values, where the sign and exponent are the same as
for 32-bit floating point values, but the significand is stored
using 64 bits.
The (unsigned) significand f will represent the real num-
ber f = f/232. In other words, the highest bit of f corre-
sponds to 1/2, the second one to 1/4, etc. In order to obtain
real floating point behavior,we require that the representation
is normalized, i.e., that the highest bit of f is always 1 (unless
the number to be represented is zero, in which case f = 0,
s corresponds to the sign of the value, and the biased expo-
nent e = 0). Hence, for all nonzero floats, we can assume that
f ∈ [1/2, 1).With our single-precision floating point values,
we achieve 32-bit significand precision, which is somewhere
in between IEEE single and double precision. The double-
precision floating point values achieve 64-bit significand pre-
cision, which is more than the IEEE double precision.
The sign s can have two values: 1 and 0 denoting plus
and minus, respectively. Note that we are using a convention
opposite to the standard one to implement specific optimiza-
tions. As we are using a 16-bit shared variable e to store the
exponent, we do not need to limit the exponent to 11 bits like
in the standard representation. Instead we will use 15 bits
(we do not use all 16 because we want to keep the highest bit
free), and we introduce a bias of 214 − 1.
In a typical implementation of floating point arithmetic,
care is taken to deal with exponent under- and overflows. In
general, all kinds of exceptional cases (including under- and
overflows, division by zero,
√−1) are very problematic to
ALGORITHM 2: Protocol for multiplying two n-bit (n ∈ {32, 64})
shared floating point numbers [[N ′′]] ← MultFloat([[N ]], [[N ′]])
Input: Shared floating point values [[N ]] and [[N ′]]
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′′]] such that N ′′ = N · N ′
1 Set [[s′′]] ← Eq([[s]], [[s′]])
2 Set [[e′′]] ← [[e + e′]]
3 Cast the shared significands [[ f ]] and [[ f ′]] to 2 · n bits and multiply to
obtain [[ f ′′]]2n
4 Truncate [[ f ′′]]2n down to n bits
5 Compute the highest bit λ of f ′′ as [[λ]] ← [[ f ′′]]  (n − 1) //
Normalize the significand
6 if [[λ]] = 0 then
7 [[ f ′′]] ← [[ f ′′]] 	 1
8 [[e′′]] ← [[e′′]] − 1
9 end
10 return [[N ′′]] = ([[s′′]], [[ f ′′]], [[e′′]])
handle with secret-shared computations, as issuing any kind
of error message as a part of control flow leaks information
(e.g., the division by zero error reveals the divisor).
We argue, that inmany practical cases, it is possible to ana-
lyze the format of the data, based on knowledge about their
contents. This allows the analysts to know that the data fall
within certain limits and construct their algorithms accord-
ingly. This makes the control flow of protocols independent
of the inputs and preserves privacy in all possible cases. For
example, consider the scenario, where the data are gathered
as 32-bit integers and then the values are cast to floating
point numbers. Thus, the exponent cannot exceed 32, which
means that we can multiply 29 of such values without over-
flowing the maximal possible exponent 214. This approach
to exceptions is basically the same as Strategy 3 used in the
article [15].
4.3 Multiplication
The simplest protocol for floating point arithmetic is multi-
plication, as the underlying representation of floating point
numbers is multiplicative. The routine for multiplying two
secret-shared floating point numbers is presented in Algo-
rithm 2. In the following, we will use the notation [[N ]] to
denote the triple ([[s]], [[ f ]], [[e]]). Throughout this and sev-
eral following protocols, we will make use of primitives
described in [8]. Recall, that we do not check for any expo-
nent under- or overflows during multiplication.
The general idea of the algorithm is natural. The sign of
the product is determined as an equality bit of the arguments
(line 1) and can be computed as
Eq([[s]], [[s′]]) = [[(1 − s) · (1 − s′)]] + [[s · s′]]
= 1 − [[s]] − [[s′]] + 2 · [[s · s′]] .
The exponent of the result is the sum of the exponents of
the arguments (line 2), and the significands are multiplied.
However, if we simply multiplied the representations of the
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significands, we would obtain a wrong result. For example,
our reference frameworkSharemind usesn-bit integers (n ∈
{32, 64}) and arithmetic modulo 2n . Hence, out of the 2n
product bits, we obtain the lowest n after implicit modular
reduction. These, however, are the least significant bits for
out floating point significand representation, and we actually
need the highest n bits instead. Therefore, we need to cast
our additively shared n-bit values temporarily to 2n bits and
truncate the product to n bits again. Both of these operations
are nontrivial, as we cannot ignore the overflow bits while
casting up nor can we just throw away the last bits when
truncating, and these cases are rather troublesome to handle
obliviously.
For the casting on line 3, keep in mind that as Sharemind
uses modular arithmetic, then while casting the significand
up, we need to account for the overflow error generated by
the increase in the modulus. For instance, if we are dealing
with 32-bit floats, the significand is 32 bits. When we cast
it to 64 bits, we might get an overflow of up to 2 bits. To
deal with this problem, we check obliviously whether our
resulting 64 bit float is larger than 232 and 233 and adjust the
larger value accordingly.
Truncation on line 4 can be performed by deleting the
lower n bits of each share. This way we will lose the possible
overflow that comes from adding the lower bits. This will
result in a rounding error, so we check whether the lower n
bits actually generate overflow.Wedo this similarly to the up-
casting process—by checking whether the sum of the three
shares of the lower n bits is larger than 232 and 233. Then,
we truncate the product of the significands and obliviously
add 0, 1 or 2 depending on the overflow we received as the
result of the comparison.
For nonzero input values, we have f, f ′ ∈ [1/2, 1), and
hence f ′′ = f · f ′ ∈ [1/4, 1) (note that precise trunca-
tion also prevents us from falling out of this interval). If the
product is in the interval [1/4, 1/2), we need to normalize
it. We detect the need for normalization by the highest bit of
f ′′ which is 0 exactly if f ∈ [1/4, 1/2). If so, we need to
shift the significand one position left (line 7) and reduce the
exponent by 1 (line 8).
The Sharemind system does not hide the execution flow
of protocols, so whenever if-then statements have secret-
shared values in the condition, an oblivious choice is used
in the implementation. For example, the statement on line 6
is implemented using the following oblivious choice:
[[ f ′′]] ← [[λ · f ′′]] + [[(1 − λ) · ( f ′′ 	 1)]],
[[e′′]] ← [[e′′]] − 1 + [[λ]] .
A general way for obliviously choosing between two inputs
is given in Algorithm 3. In case of floating point numbers,
we perform three oblivious choices separately for each com-
ALGORITHM 3: Protocol for obliviously choosing a between two
shared values [[x]] and [[y]] based on a shared condition [[c]]
Input: Shared values [[x]], [[y]] and shared condition [[c]]
Output: Shared value [[x]] if [[c]] is true (1) or [[y]] if [[c]] is false (0)
1 Set [[z]] ← [[c · x]] + [[(1 − c) · y]]
2 return z
ALGORITHM 4: Protocol for adding two n-bit (n ∈ {32, 64}) shared
floating point numbers [[N ′′]] ← AddFloat([[N ]], [[N ′]])
Input: Shared floating point values [[N ]] and [[N ′]]
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′′]] such that N ′′ = N + N ′
1 Assume [[e′ − e]] ≥ 0 (if not, switch [[N ]] and [[N ′]])
2 if [[e′ − e]] ≥ n then // N ′ is so much larger that effectively N = 0
3 return [[N ′]]
4 end
5 Set [[ f ]] ← [[ f  (e′ − e)]] and [[e′′]] ← [[e′]]
6 if s = s′ then
7 [[s′′]] ← [[s]]
8 Cast [[ f ]] and [[ f ′]] to 2n bits
9 [[ f ′′]] ← [[ f ]] + [[ f ′]]
10 [[b]] = [[ f ′′]]  n // Let the (n + 1)st bit of [[ f ′′]] be [[b]]
11 [[ f ′′]] ← [[ f ′′ · (1 − b)]] + [[ f ′′]]
12 [[ f ′′]]  1, [[e′′]] ← [[e′′]] + [[b]] // Correcting the overflow
13 Cast [[ f ′′]] down to n bits
14 else
15 Let [[b]] ← [[ f ′]] ?≥ [[ f ]]
16 [[s′′]] ← Eq([[s′]], [[b]])
17 if [[b]] then
18 [[ f ′′]] ← [[ f ′]] − [[ f ]] // This can give a nonnormalized
significand!
19 else
20 [[ f ′′]] ← [[ f ]] − [[ f ′]] // This can give a nonnormalized
significand!
21 end
22 Normalize [[N ′′]] = ([[s′′]], [[ f ′′]], [[e′′]])
23 end
24 return [[N ′′]]
ponent s, f and e. This is faster and more precise than mul-
tiplying floating point numbers with one and zero.
4.4 Addition
Because of the multiplicative representation of floating point
numbers, addition is more difficult to implement than multi-
plication and requires us to consider more special cases.
The overall structure of the addition routine is presented
in Algorithm 4. In order to add two numbers, their dec-
imal points need to be aligned. The size of the required
shift is determined by the difference of the exponents of
the inputs. We perform an oblivious switch of the inputs
based on the bit [[e′]] ?≥ [[e]], so that in the following, we
can assume that [[e′]] ≥ [[e]] (line 1). Our reference architec-
ture Sharemind uses n-bit integers to store the significands,
hence if [[e′]] − [[e]] ≥ n, adding N is efficiently as good
as adding 0, and we can just output [[N ′]] (line 2). Unfor-
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ALGORITHM 5: Protocol for shifting a shared value [[ f ]] of n bits
right by a shared number of positions [[p]]
Input: Shared values [[ f ]] and [[p]], where 0 ≤ p ≤ n − 1
Output: Shared value [[ f  p]]
1 Compute in parallel [[ fi ]] = [[ f ]]  i , i = (0, . . . , n − 1)
2 [[p]] ← BitExtr[[p]]
3 Compute the characteristic bits [[pi ]] (i = 0, . . . , n − 1) based on [[p]]
4 return
∑n−1
i=0 [[ fi · pi ]]
tunately, in the implementation, we cannot halt the compu-
tation here, as the control flow must be data independent,
but this check is needed for the following routines to work
correctly. Instead of returning, the result of the private com-
parison is stored, and an oblivious choice is performed at
the end of the protocol to make sure that the correct value is
returned.
On line 5, we shift one of the significands to align the
decimal points and adjust the exponent. Moving on to the
if-else statement on lines 6–22, the operation performed on
the significands depends on the sign bits. If they are equal
(lines 6–13), we need to add the significands, and otherwise
subtract them. When adding the significands, the result may
exceed 1, so we may need to shift it back by one position.
In order to achieve this functionality, we use temporary cast-
ing to 2n bits similarly to the process in Algorithm 2 for
multiplication.
If the sign bits differ, we need to subtract the smaller sig-
nificand from the larger one. As a result, we may end up with
a value < 1/2, in which case we need to normalize the value
(lines 15–22). The if-else statement on lines 17–20 can be
computed as
[[ f ′′]] = [[b · ( f ′ − f )]] + [[(1 − b) · ( f − f ′)]]
= 2 · [[b · ( f ′ − f )]] + [[ f ]] − [[ f ′]].
Note that the right shift used on line 5 of Algorithm 4must
be done obliviously as the value has to be shifted by a private
number of bits. Oblivious shift right can be accomplished by
using Algorithm 5. First, we compute all the possible n right-
shifted values in parallel. Next, we extract the bits of the shift
using the BitExtr routine from [8]. Recall that p ∈ [0, n−1],
so we obtain log2(n) bits. Next, based on these log2(n) bits
we compose a characteristic vector consisting of n shared
bits, of which most have value 0 and exactly one has value 1.
The value 1 occurs in the p-th position of the vector. Finally,
the final result can be obtained by computing the dot product
between the vector of shifted values and the characteristic
vector.
Normalization of the significand and the exponent on line
22 of Algorithm 4 can be performed by using Algorithm 6. It
works with a similar principle as Algorithm 5 and performs
an oblivious selection from a vector of elements containing
all the possible output values. The selection vector is com-
ALGORITHM 6: Protocol for normalizing an n-bit shared floating
point value [[N ]]
Input: Shared floating point value [[N ]] = ([[s]], [[ f ]], [[e]]), where the
highest nonzero bit of f is on p-th position from the highest bit
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′]] = ([[s]], [[ f ′]], [[e′]]) such
that f ′ = f 	 p and e′ = e − p. If N = 0 then N ′ = 0
1 [[g]] ← MSNZB([[ f ]])
2 Compute in parallel [[ fi ]] = [[ f ]] 	 i , i = (0, . . . , n − 1)
3 [[ f ′]] ← ∑n−1i=0 [[ fi · gn−1−i ]]
4 [[e′]] ← ∑n−1i=0 [[(e − i) · gn−1−i ]]
5 return [[N ′]] = ([[s]], [[ f ′]], [[e′]])
puted using the MSNZB (most significant nonzero bit) rou-
tine from [8] which outputs n additively shared bits, at most
one being equal to 1 in the position corresponding to the
highest nonzero bit of the input. The vectors from which we
obliviously select consist of all the possible shifts of the sig-
nificands (lines 2 and 3) and the corresponding adjustments
of the exponents (line 4).
5 Elementary functions
In this section, we present algorithms for four elementary
functions, namely inversion, square root, exponentiation of
e and error function. All of them are built using Taylor series
expansion, and we also give a version using the Chebyshev
polynomial for inversion and the exponentiation of e. Poly-
nomial evaluations are sufficiently robust for our purposes.
They allow us to compute the functions using only addi-
tions and multiplications, and do so in a data-independent
manner. Taylor series expansion also gives us a convenient
way to have several trade-offs between speed and preci-
sion.
5.1 Inversion
We implement division by first taking the inverse of the divi-
sor and then multiplying the result with the dividend. We






(1 − x)n .
Algorithm 7 describes how to take the inverse of a shared
n-bit float using Taylor series. As the inverse of a value N
converges best in the interval (0, 1], we separate the signif-
icand f ∈ [ 12 , 1) from the given floating point number and
use the following equation:
1
f · 2e =
1
f
· 2−e . (1)
To achieve this, we compose a new floating point value
[[S]] based on the significand [[ f ]] on line 2. Note that
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ALGORITHM 7: Protocol for taking the inverse of an n-bit shared
floating point value [[N ]] with precision p using Taylor series
Input: Shared floating point value [[N ]] = ([[s]], [[ f ]], [[e]])
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′]] such that [[N ′]] = 1[[N ]]
1 Let [[S]] = ([[sS]], [[ fS]], [[eS]]) and [[S′]] = ([[sS′ ]], [[ fS′ ]], [[eS′ ]]) be
shared floats
2 Set [[sS]] ← 1, [[ fS]] ← [[ f ]] and [[eS]] ← 0
3 Set [[S]] ← 1 − [[S]]
4 Evaluate the Taylor series [[S′]] ← ∑pn=0 [[S]]n
5 Set [[e′]] ← [[eS′ ]] − [[e]]
6 return [[N ′]] = ([[s]], [[ fS]], [[e′]])
we make this new float always positive for optimization
purposes and, at the end of the protocol, we reintroduce
the sign s from the input float [[N ]] (line 6). When we
have evaluated the Taylor series for inverse, we correct
the exponent based on equality (1) by subtracting the pre-
vious exponent from the exponent of the sum [[S′]] (line
5).
As Sharemind works fastest with parallelised computa-
tions, we do as much of the Taylor series evaluation in par-
allel as possible. This parallelization is described in Algo-
rithm 8. Variations of this algorithm can be adopted for the
specific polynomial evaluations where needed, but this algo-
rithm gives a general idea of how the process works. We
use Algorithm 8 to parallelise polynomial evaluation in all
elementary functions we implement.
We need to compute powers of [[x]] from [[x1]] to [[x p]].
To do this in parallel, we fill vector [[u]] with all the powers
we have already computed [[x1]], . . . , [[xh]] and the second
vector [[v]] with the highest power of [[x]] we have computed
[[xh]]. When we multiply these vectors element-wise, we get
powers of [[x]] from [[xh+1]] to [[x2h]] (lines 6–16). If the
given precision p is not a power of 2; however, we also need
to do one extra parallel multiplication to get the rest of the
powers from [[xh]] to [[x p]]. This is done on lines 18–29. If
the precision is <1.5 times larger than the highest power, it
is not necessary to add elements to the vector [[u]] (checked
on line 20).
The if-else statements in Algorithm 8 are based on public
values, so there is no need to use oblivious choice to hide
which branch is taken. The summation of vector elements on
line 35 is done in parallel as much as possible.
As the Taylor series evaluation requires at least 32 summa-
tion terms to achieve the precision we need, we also offer an
alternative algorithm for computing inverse using the corre-
sponding approximated Chebyshev polynomial [26]. Algo-
rithm 9 is similar to Algoritm 7, but instead of evaluating
Taylor series, we compute the Chebyshev polynomial using
the parallelization from Algorithm 8.
ALGORITHM 8: Algorithm for parallel polynomial evaluation
Input: Shared floating point value [[x]], precision p, coefficients for
the polynomial a0, . . . , ap
Output: Shared floating point value [[x ′]] such that
[[x ′]] = ∑pn=0 an · xn
1 Let [[y]] = ([[y0]], . . . , [[yp]]) // For storing the powers of x
2 Set [[y0]] ← 1, [[y1]] ← [[x]] and [[y2]] ← [[x2]]
3 Let [[u]], [[v]] and [[w]] be shared vectors of size 1
4 Set [[u0]] ← [[x]], and [[w0]] ← [[x2]]
5 Let h = 2 denote the highest power of x we have computed thus far
6 while 2h ≤ p do
7 Resize [[u]], [[v]], [[w]] to size h
8 for i = h/2 + 1 to h do
9 Set [[ui−1]] ← [[xi ]]
10 end
11 Fill [[v]] with [[xh ]]
12 Multiply in parallel [[wi ]] ← [[ui · vi ]], i = (0, . . . , h − 1) // To get
[[xh+1]], . . . , [[x2h]]
13 for i = h + 1 to 2h do
14 Set [[yi ]] ← [[xi ]]
15 end
16 Set h ← 2h
17 end
18 if 2h > p then
19 Resize [[u]] and [[v]] to size p − h
20 if (p > h + h/2) then
21 for i = h/2 + 1 to p do
22 Set [[ui−1]] ← [[x]]i
23 end
24 end
25 Fill [[v]] with [[xh ]]
26 Resize [[w]] to size p − h
27 Multiply in parallel [[wi ]] ← [[ui · vi ]], i = (0, . . . , p − h − 1) //
To get [[xh+1]], . . . , [[x p]]
28 for i = h + 1 to p do
29 Set [[yi ]] ← [[xi ]]
30 end
31 end
32 for i = 0 to p do
33 Set [[yi ]] ← [[yi · ai ]] // Multiplication with the given constants
34 end
35 Set [[x ′]] as the sum of the elements of [[y]]
36 return [[x ′]]
ALGORITHM 9: Protocol for taking the inverse of an n-bit shared
floating point value [[N ]] using the Chebyshev polynomial
Input: Shared floating point value [[N ]] = ([[s]], [[ f ]], [[e]])
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′]] such that [[N ′]] = 1[[N ]]
1 Let [[S]] and [[S′]] be shared floats ([[sS]], [[ fS]], [[eS]]) and
([[sS′ ]], [[ fS′ ]], [[eS′ ]]), respectively
2 Set [[sS]] ← 1, [[ fS]] ← [[ f ]] and [[eS]] ← 0
3 Set [[S′]] ← −12.9803173971914[[S7]] + 77.6035205859554[[S6]] −
201.355944395853[[S5]] + 296.100609596203[[S4]] −
269.870620651938[[S3]] + 156.083648732173[[S2]] −
55.9375000000093[[S]] + 11.3566017177974
4 Set [[e′]] ← [[eS′ ]] − [[e]]
5 return [[N ′]] = ([[s]], [[ fS]], [[e′]])
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ALGORITHM 10: Protocol for finding the square root of a floating
point number [[N ′]] ← √[[|N |]] with precision p
Input: Shared floating point value [[N ]]
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′]] such that N ′ = √|N | with
precision p
1 Let [[ f ]] be the significand of [[|N |]]
2 Set [[x]] ← [[ f ]] − 1
3 Let [[S]] be a shared float ([[sS]], [[ fS]], [[eS]])
4 Evaluate the Taylor series
[[S]] ← ∑pn=1 (−1)
n−1(2n−2)!
(1−2n−2)((n−1)!)24n−1 · [[xn−1]]
5 Set [[e′]] ← [[eS]] + ([[e]]  1) // Divide [[e]] by 2
6 Set [[N ′]] ← (1, [[ fS]], [[e′]])
7 Let [[b]] be the lowest bit of [[e]] // For determining whether [[e]] is
odd or even
8 if [[b]] = 1 then
9 if [[e]] ≥ 0 then
10 Set [[N ′]] ← [[N ′]] · √2
11 else






15 return [[N ′]]
5.2 Square root
Square root is the most complex of the elementary functions






(1 − 2n − 2)((n − 1)!)24n−1 · (x − 1)
n−1 .
The convergence interval of the series for square root is
(0, 2). Thus, we will compute the square root of the signifi-
cand and multiply it with a correcting exponential term:
√
f · 2e = √ f · 2e/2 . (2)
Algorithm 10 shows how square root is computed based
on Eq. (2).We start by creating a float containing the absolute
value of the significand [[ f ]] of the original value N and go
on by evaluating the Taylor series for [[ f ]]− 1. Line 5 marks
the beginning of the computation of the exponent. We first
divide the exponent by 2 by shifting the exponent right once
and adding it to the exponent [[eS]] we received as a result
of the Taylor series evaluation. On line 7, we find the lowest
bit of the exponent to determine whether it is even or odd.
Now, we still have to compensate for the bit we lost during
division (lines 8–14). If the exponent is even, we do nothing,




2 depending on the sign of the exponent. The if-then
statements on lines 8–14 and 9–13 need to be performed
obliviously, as both [[b]] and [[e]] are secret-shared values.
ALGORITHM 11: Protocol for raising e to the power of float value
[[N ]] with precision p using Taylor series
Input: Shared floating point value [[N ]] = ([[s]], [[ f ]], [[e]])
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′]] such that [[N ′]] = e[[N ]]
with precision p
1 Evaluate the Taylor series [[N ′]] ← ∑pn=0 1n! · [[Nn]]
2 return [[N ′]] = ([[s]], [[ fS]], [[e′]])
ALGORITHM 12: Protocol for exponentiating e to the power of an
n-bit shared floating point value [[N ]] using the separation of integer
and fractional parts of [[N ]]
Input: Shared floating point value [[N ]] = ([[s]], [[ f ]], [[e]])
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′]] = e[[N ]]
1 Set [[y]] ← 1.44269504 · [[N ]] // Change bases
2 Denote the integer part of [[y]] by [[[y]]] and the fractional part by
[[{y}]]
3 Set [[[y]]] ← [[(−1)1−s · (( f  (n − e)) + (1 − s))]] // Find the
integer part
4 Set [[{y}]] ← [[y]] − [[[y]]] // Find the fractional part (always positive)
5 Let 2[[[y]]] = ([[s′]], [[ f ′]], [[e′]])
6 Set [[s′]] ← 1, [[ f ′]] ← 100 . . . 0, and [[e′]] ← [[[y]]] + 1
7 Set 2[[{y}]] ← 0.0136839828938349[[{y}4]] +
0.0517177354601992[[{y}3]] + 0.241621322662927[[{y}2]] +
0.692969550931914[[{y}]] + 1.00000359714456
8 return [[N ′]] = 2[[[y]]] · 2[[{y}]]
5.3 Exponentiation of e








Unfortunately, the larger [[N ]] is, the more we have to
increase precision p to keep the result of the Taylor series
evaluation fromdeviating from the real result toomuch. This,
however, increases the working time of the algorithm sig-
nificantly. To solve this problem, we implemented another
algorithm using the separation of the integer and fractional
parts of the power [[N ]] and using the Chebyshev polynomial
to approximate the result [26]. This solution is described in
Algorithm 12.
In this case, we exponentiate e using the knowledge that
ex = (2log2 e)x = 2(log2 e)·x . Knowing this, we can first com-
pute y = (log2 e) · x ≈ 1.44269504 · x (line 1) and then 2y .
Notice, that 2y = 2[y]+{y} = 2[y] · 2{y}, where [y] denotes
the integer part and {y} the fractional part of y.
First, we need to separate the integer part from the shared
value [[y]] = ([[s]], [[ f ]], [[e]]). Let n be the number of bits of
f . In this case, [[[|y|]]] = [[ f  (n−e)]] (line 3) is true if and
only if [[e]] ≤ n. On the other hand, if [[e]] > n, then [[y]] ≥
2[[e]]−1 > 2n−1 would also hold, and we would be trying to
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ALGORITHM 13: Protocol for computing the error function for
shared floating point value [[N ]] with precision p
Input: Shared floating point value [[N ]] = ([[s]], [[ f ]], [[e]])
Output: Shared floating point value [[N ′]] such that [[N ′]] = erf([[N ]])
with precision p
1 if [[e]] ≥ 3 then
2 Set N ′ ← (−1)1−[[s]]
3 else





n!(2n+1) · [[N 2n+1]]
5 end
6 return [[N ′]]
compute a value that is not smaller than 22
n−1
. Hence, we
consider the requirement [[e]] ≤ n to be reasonable.
Note, however, that if we want to use the Chebyshev poly-
nomial to compute 2{y}, we need to use two different poly-
nomials for the positive and negative case. We would like
to avoid this if possible for optimization, hence, we want to
keep {y} always positive. This is easily done if y is positive,
but causes problems if y is negative. So if y is negative and
wewant to compute the integer part of y, we compute it in the
normalway and add1 (line 3)making its absolute value larger
than that of y. Now, when we subtract the gained integer to
gain the fraction on line 4, we always get a positive value.
This allows us to only evaluate one Chebyshev polynomial,
thus giving us a slight performance improvement.
We construct the floating point value 2[[[y]]] by setting the
corresponding significand to be 100 . . . 0 and the exponent to
be [[[y]]]+1. As [[{y}]] ∈ [0, 1] holds for the fractional part of
y, and we have made sure that the fraction is always positive,
we can compute 2[[{y}]] using the Chebyshev polynomial on
line 7. In this domain, these polynomials will give a result
that is accurate to the fifth decimal place. Finally, wemultiply
2[[[y]]] · 2[[{y}]] to gain the result.
5.4 Error function







n!(2n + 1) · x
2n+1 .
Algorithm 13 describes how to compute the error function
using Taylor series.
Note, that the Taylor series for the error function works on
odd powers of x . To use the parallelization trick from Algo-























n!(2n + 1) · y
n .
From this, it is easy to see that we can evaluate the Taylor
series for y and then multiply the result by x .
Note that, in addition, we check whether the exponent is
larger or smaller than 3, which shows us whether x ∈ [−2, 2]
and based on the private comparison, we obliviously set the
result as ±1 according to the original sign [[s]] (line 2). We
perform this approximation because at larger values, more
cycles are needed for a sufficiently accurate result.
6 Performance of floating point operations
6.1 Benchmark results
We implemented the secure floating point operations
described in this paper on the Sharemind 3 secure compu-
tation system. We built the implementation using the three-
party protocol suite already implemented in the Sharemind
system. Several low-level protocolswere developed and opti-
mized to simplify the use and conversion of shared values
with different bit sizes. Secure floating point operations are
programmed as compositions of low-level integer protocols.
To measure the performance of the floating point opera-
tions, we deployed the developed software on three servers
connected with fast network connections. More specifically,
each of the servers used contains two Intel X5670 2.93GHz
CPUs with 6 cores and 48GB of memory. The network
connections are point-to-point 1Gb/s connections. We note
that during the experiments, peak resource usage for each
machine did not exceed 2 cores and 1GB of RAM. The peak
network usage varied during the experiments, but did not
exceed 50Mb/s. Therefore, we believe that the performance
can be improved with further optimizations.
Integer operations on Sharemind perform more effi-
ciently on multiple inputs [8]. Therefore, we also imple-
mented floating point operations as vector operations. Unary
operations take a single input vector and binary operations
take two input vectors of an equal size. Both kinds of opera-
tions produce a vector result. We performed the benchmarks
on vectors of various sizes to estimate how much the size of
the vector affects the processing efficiency.
For each operation and input size, we performed 10 iter-
ations of the operation and computed the average. The only
exceptions to this rule were operations based on Taylor series
or Chebyshev polynomials running on the largest input vec-
tor. Their running timewas extensively long sowe performed
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only a few tests for each of them. In the presentation, such
results are marked with an asterisk.
Tables 1 and 2 present the benchmarking results for float-
ing point numbers with 32-bit significands and 64-bit sig-
nificands, respectively. We see that with smaller input sizes,
there is nodifference in the running timeof single anddouble-
precision operations. However, for larger input vector sizes,
the additional communication starts to slow down the com-
putation as the network channel gets saturated.
Addition and multiplication are the primitive operations
with addition being about five times slower than multipli-
cation. With single-precision floating point numbers, both
can achieve the speed of a thousand operations per second if
the input vectors are sufficiently large. Based on the multi-
plication primitive, we also implemented multiplication and
division by a public constant. For multiplication, there was
no gain in efficiency, because we currently simply classify
the public factor and use the private multiplication protocol.
However, for division by a public constant, we can have
serious performance gains as we just invert the divisor pub-
licly and then perform a private multiplication. Furthermore,
as our secret floating point representation is based on pow-
ers of two, we were able to make a really efficient protocol
for multiplying and dividing with public powers of two by
simply modifying the exponent. As this is a local operation,
it requires no communication, and is, therefore, very fast.
Although we isolated the network during benchmarking,
there was enough fluctuation caused by the flow control to
slightly vary the speeds of similar operations. Although pri-
vate multiplication, multiplication and division by constant
are performed using the same protocol, their speeds vary due
to effects caused by networking.
The unary operations are implemented using either Taylor
series orChebyshev polynomials.When available,we bench-
marked both cases. In all such cases, Chebyshev polynomials
provide better performance, because smaller polynomials are
evaluated to compute the function. In general, all these oper-
ations have similar performance.
As mentioned in Sect. 5.1, division between two private
floating point values is implemented by inverting the second
parameter and performing a private multiplication. As inver-
sion is significantly slower than multiplication, the running
time of division is mostly dictated by the running time of
inversion.
6.2 Difference in the precision of Taylor series and
Chebyshev polynomials
In Sect. 5, we give two algorithms for computing inverse and
powers of e based on Taylor series and Chebyshev polyno-
mials. It is easy to see from Tables 1 and 2 that using the
Chebyshev polynomial versions to approximate the results
gives us better performance.
Figure 5 shows the difference in the precision of these
two polynomials. Panel (a) describes the absolute error that
computing the inverse using both algorithms produces in the
interval [1/2, 1]. As can be seen from the figure, the absolute
error produced by the evaluation of 32 terms of the Taylor
series is far < 10−6. The maximum error produced by the
evaluation of 8 terms of the Chebyshev polynomial is not
larger than 2.1 × 10−6. The algorithm separates the expo-
nent, then works on the significand, and, finally, subtracts the
exponent. This means that the absolute error of the Cheby-
shev polynomial will grow as the value being inverted grows.
The error of the Taylor series evaluation is so small that it
will start showing itself significantly later.
Panel (b) shows similar reasoning for exponentiation with
the different polynomials. As 32 elements of Taylor series
for exponentiation will not be enough to produce a precise
result after x = 13 and will produce an absolute error of
more than 2 × 106 at x = 20, we give this plot in the inter-
val [0, 15] and show the relative error instead of the absolute
error. As can be seen from the figure, the relative error pro-
duced by evaluation of 5 terms of the Chebyshev polynomial
always stays between −2.9 × 10−6 and 3.4 × 10−6. Taylor
series evaluation is more precise until x = 13 after which the
relative error increases. This point can be pushed further by
adding more terms to the Taylor series evaluation at the cost
of performance.
As expected, Fig. 5 indicates that using the Taylor series
evaluation gives us a more precise result but, in larger algo-
rithms, it can be a bottleneck. We propose that the choice of
the algorithm be done based on the requirements of the prob-
lem being solved—if precision is important, Taylor series
evaluation should be used, if speed is important, Chebyshev
polynomials are the wiser choice. If the problem requires
both speed and precision, it is possible to add terms to the
Chebyshev polynomial to make it more precise. In addition,
as the error in exponentiation using Taylor series evaluation
becomes significant when x grows, Chebyshev polynomials
should be used if it is expected that x will exceed 10. Another
option is to raise the number of terms in Taylor series but this
will, in turn, increase the running time of the algorithm.
6.3 Benefits of parallelization
The benchmarking results confirm that our implementation
of secure floating point operations is more efficient on many
simultaneous inputs. The amortized cost of processing a sin-
gle input or a pair of inputs is reduced as the input size grows.
We performed an additional round of experiments tomeasure
the extent of this behavior. We ran the addition and multipli-
cation operations with a wider range of steps to determine the
optimal number of parallel additions andmultiplications.We
fitted the results with two linear regressions and plotted the
result. The resulting plot for single-precision floating point
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Table 1 Performance of single-precision floating point operations
Input size in elements
1 10 100 1,000 10,000
Private x Add 0.73 ops 7.3 ops 69 ops 540 ops 610 ops
Private y Multiply 2.3 ops 23 ops 225 ops 1,780 ops 6,413 ops
Divide (TS) 0.08 ops 0.81 ops 6.8 ops 25.5 ops 38 ops∗
Divide (CP) 0.16 ops 1.6 ops 14 ops 59 ops 79 ops∗
Private x Multiply 2.3 ops 23 ops 220 ops 1,736 ops 6,321 ops
Public y Multiply by 2k 5.9 × 104 ops 6.1 × 105 ops 4.2 × 106 ops 1.1 × 107 ops 1.4 × 107 ops
Divide 2.3 ops 23 ops 221 ops 1,727 ops 6,313 ops
Divide by 2k 6.4 × 104 ops 6.1 × 105 ops 4.1 × 106 ops 1.2 × 107 ops 1.4 × 107 ops
Private x Find ex (TS) 0.09 ops 0.9 ops 7.3 ops 23 ops 30 ops∗
Find ex (CP) 0.12 ops 1.2 ops 11 ops 71 ops 114 ops
Invert (TS) 0.09 ops 0.84 ops 6.8 ops 14.7 ops 35.7 ops∗
Invert (CP) 0.17 ops 1.7 ops 15.3 ops 55.2 ops 66.4 ops
Square root 0.09 ops 0.85 ops 7 ops 24 ops 32 ops∗
Error function 0.1 ops 0.97 ops 8.4 ops 30 ops 39 ops
All performance values are in operations per second (ops). Operations marked with TS and CP use Taylor series or Chebyshev polynomials,
respectively. For the exponent function, square root, inversion and division, the number of elements in the Taylor series is 32. For the error function,
16 elements are computed
Table 2 Performance of double-precision floating point operations
Input size in elements
1 10 100 1,000 10,000
Private x Add 0.68 ops 6.8 ops 60 ops 208 ops 244 ops
Private y Multiply 2.1 ops 21 ops 195 ops 1,106 ops 2,858 ops
Divide (TS) 0.08 ops 0.7 ops 3 ops 5.2 ops 12.4 ops∗
Divide (CP) 0.15 ops 1.5 ops 12 ops 23 ops 52 ops∗
Private x Multiply 2.1 ops 21 ops 193 ops 1263 ops 2667 ops
Public y Multiply by 2k 3.3 × 104 ops 3.2 × 105 ops 2.1 × 106 ops 8.5 × 106 ops 1.3 × 107 ops
Divide 2.1 ops 21 ops 194 ops 1223 ops 2573 ops
Divide by 2k 6.4 × 104 ops 6.1 × 105 ops 4 × 106 ops 1 × 107 ops 1.2 × 107 ops
Private x Find ex (TS) 0.09 ops 0.8 ops 3.1 ops 4.5 ops 6.2 ops∗
Find ex (CP) 0.11 ops 1.1 ops 9.7 ops 42 ops 50 ops
Invert (TS) 0.08 ops 0.75 ops 3.6 ops 4.8 ops 10.7 ops∗
Invert (CP) 0.16 ops 1.5 ops 11.1 ops 29.5 ops 47.2 ops
Square root 0.08 ops 0.76 ops 4.6 ops 9.7 ops 10.4 ops∗
Error function 0.09 ops 0.89 ops 5.8 ops 16 ops 21 ops∗
All performance values are in operations per second (ops). Operations marked with TS and CP use Taylor series or Chebyshev polynomials,
respectively. For the exponent function, square root, inversion and division, the number of elements in the Taylor series is 32. For the error function,
16 elements are computed
operations is in Fig. 6. The corresponding plot for double-
precision numbers is in Fig. 7.
Note that the running time of the secure computation
protocols grows very little until a certain point, when it
starts growing nearly linearly in the size of the inputs.
At this point, the secure computation protocols saturate
the network link and are working at their maximum effi-
ciency. Addition is a more complex operation with more
communication and; therefore, we can perform less addi-
tions before the network link becomes saturated. Addition
takes even more communication with double-precision num-
bers so it is predictable that the saturation point occurs
earlier than for single-precision values. Multiplication uses
significantly less network communication, so its behavior
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Fig. 5 Comparison of the precision of the implemented Taylor series and Chebyshev polynomials
Fig. 6 The efficiency of
single-precision addition and
multiplication in relation to
input size
Fig. 7 The efficiency of
double-precision addition and
multiplication in relation to
input size
is roughly similar with both single- and double-precision
numbers.
Based on these observations, we decided to use vector
operations in our collision probability computation for both
primitives and the main algorithm. To validate this direction,
we measured the performance of the matrix product function
with several sequential executions versus oneormore parallel
executions. In the sequential case, a number of matrix multi-
plications were performed one after the other. In the parallel
case, they were performed simultaneously, using the effi-
ciency of vector operations as much as possible. The results
are given in Table 3.
We see that, for a single input, there is no significant differ-
ence between the running time of the sequential and parallel
version. This is logical, as there is nothing to vectorize. How-
ever, as the number of multiplications grows, parallel execu-
tion becomes dramaticallymore efficient. However,when the
network saturates, the performance of the parallel case also
become more linear in the number of inputs, as illustrated
by the 10 × 10 case. Even then, the parallel case is much
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Table 3 Sequential and parallel





each matrix size, 10 iterations
were performed and the average
of the results was computed.
Durations are given in seconds
Number of matrix multiplications
1 (s) 10 (s) 100 (s) 1,000 (s)
3 × 3 Sequential 3.2 31.9 318.5 3,212.3
Matrix Parallel 3.2 3.3 5.2 45.7
5 × 5 Sequential 4.6 46.3 466 4,641.4
Matrix Parallel 4.6 5.1 20.4 91.9
10 × 10 Sequential 6.4 65.9 674.6 6,624.2
matrix Parallel 6.6 15.7 152 1,189.2
faster than the sequential case. This justifies our decision to
use vectorization to the highest possible degree. We note that
this increase in efficiency comes at the cost of needing more
memory. However, we can control the size of our inputs and
balance vectorization and memory use.
7 Implementation of collision analysis
7.1 Reusable components
We implemented the collision analysis described in Algo-
rithm 1 for Sharemind in its language SecreC. This allows
us to easily do parallel operations on vectors as it has syntax
for element-wise operations onvectors.Wefirst implemented
the algorithmand its componentmethods for one satellite pair
using as much parallelization as possible and then went on
to parallelise the solution further for n satellite pairs.
One of the most important values of our code is its
reusability. The vector and matrix operations we have imple-
mented can later be used in other algorithms similarly to
the modular design of software solutions that is the norm in
the industry. This makes it convenient to implement other
algorithms that make use of vector and matrix operations.
In addition, the operations have already been parallelised so
future developers will not have to put time into this step of
the coding process in SecreC.
7.2 Vector and matrix operations
We implemented and parallelised a number of vector and
matrix operations:
– Vector length, unit vector and dot product for vectors of
any size;
– Cross product for vectors of size 3;
– Matrix product for two-dimensional matrices; and
– Eigensystem computation for 2 × 2 matrices.
We implemented simple and parallel methods for comput-
ing the unit vector and dot product for vectors of any length.
template domain D : additive3pp
D float64 dotProduct (D float64[[1]] x, D float64[[1]] y){
D float64[[1]] product = x * y;
return sum (product);
}
Fig. 8 Simple code for dot product
We also implemented the cross product for vectors of length
3 as we are working in three-dimensional space.
Similarly, we implemented simple and parallel methods
for matrix multiplication for two-dimensional matrices. We
also provide a slight optimization for the case of diagonal
matrices as the covariance matrices we work with are diag-
onal. This does not provide a very large speedup in the case
of one satellite pair but if many pairs are analyzed in paral-
lel, then the benefit is worth the implementation of such a
conditional method. We also implemented the eigensystem
computation for 2 × 2 matrices.
7.2.1 Dot product
Let us take a closer look at the code of the dot product. We
use this example to show the difference between the normal
and the parallelised versions of the algorithm. Figure 8 shows
the code for a simple dot product of two vectors [[x]] and [[y]].
Firstly, the vectors [[x]] and [[y]] are multiplied element-wise
and then the elements of the resulting vector [[product]] are
summed together.
Themethod fromFig. 9 gets as input twomatrices [[x]] and
[[y]]. We assume that these matrices are vectors that contain
the data of several vectors, and we assume that they have the
template domain D : additive3pp
D float64[[1]] dotProduct (D float64[[2]] x, D float64[[2]] y){
uint[[1]] xShape = shape (x);
D float64[[2]] product = x * y;
D float64[[1]] result (xShape[0]);
D float64[[1]] productVector =
reshape (product, size (product));
result = sum (productVector, xShape[0]);
return result;
}
Fig. 9 Parallelised code for dot product
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Table 4 Collision analysis performance
Number of satellite pairs
1 2 4 8 16
Single TS 258 (258) s 350 (175) s 488 (122) s 792 (99) s 1,348 (84) s
Precision CP 204 (204) s 255 (128) s 355 (89) s 557 (70) s 967 (60) s
Double TS 337 (337) s 447 (223) s 724 (181) s 1127 (141) s 2,064 (129) s
Precision CP 246 (246) s 340 (170) s 450 (113) s 724 (91) s 1,272 (80) s
Three iterations were performed for each experiment. First, we give the total running time and then the running time per satellite pair in parentheses.
We computed 40 iterations in the integral approximation. TS means that only Taylor series were used for elementary functions. CP means that
operations based on Chebyshev polynomials were used where available
same dimensions. The function shape returns a vector the
length of which is determined by the dimension of the array
it receives as input. In our case, the variablexShape is a vector
of length 2. Let the dimensions of [[x]] and [[y]] be m and n,
then xShape = (m, n), where n is the number of elements
in the vectors and m is the number of vectors. As the result,
we expect a vector of m dot products. It is easy to see, that
the dimensions of the input and output values of the parallel
version are higher by one as compared to the simple version.
We start the parallel dot product computation similarly
to the simple version—we multiply the matrices together
element-wise. The SecreC language allows us to do this eas-
ily by using the multiplication sign on two arrays of the same
dimensions. As the result, we receive the matrix [[product]]
that has the same dimensions as the input matrices. To use
the function sum that allows us to sum together vector ele-
ments, we first reshape the matrix [[product]] to a vector.
This is another array manipulation method which SecreC
provides us. Finally, we use the method that lets us sum vec-
tor elements together. However, in the parallel case, we use
a different version of the method sum that lets us sum ele-
ments together by groups, giving us xShape[0] = m sums
as a result. The second parameter of the method sum must
be a factor of the size of the vector, the elements of which
are being summed.
The benefit in using the parallel version of the method
is in the multiplication and summing sub methods. If we
computed the dot product for each satellite pair as a cycle,
we would get the products within one pair [[x1 · y1]], [[x2 ·
y2]], [[x3 ·y3]] in parallel but would not be able to use the par-
allelization for computing many pairs at once. As the mul-
tiplication and summation of floating point values is quite
time-consuming, parallelization is essential.
7.3 Benchmark results
Finally, we measured the performance of the full privacy-
preserving collision analysis implementation. We performed
two kinds of experiments. First, we measured the running
time of the algorithm on various input sizes to know if it is
feasible in practice and if there are efficiency gains in evalu-
ating many satellite pairs in parallel. Second, we profiled the
execution of a single instance of collision analysis to study,
what the bottleneck operations in its execution are.
The running time measurements are given in Table 4. We
differentiated the results based on the precision of the float-
ing point operations and the kind of approximation used for
complex operations.
The running time for a single collision probability com-
putation is 4–5min and it is reduced 1–2min with parallel
executions. Consider the scenario reported in [16], where
the Space Data Center computes the collision probabilities
twice a day for 300 satellite pairs. By extrapolating our per-
formancemeasurements (an average of 90s per satellite pair),
we see that a secure runwould be shorter than 8 h.Also, given
that we can balance the computation load to multiple secure
computation clusters, we can scale the system to process
a much larger number of satellites. Therefore, today’s per-
formance is suitable for practical use and there is room for
scalability through further optimizations.
We used the built-in profiling features of Sharemind to
analyze the breakdown of the execution time. We computed
the collision probability of a single satellite pair and mea-
sured the duration of each floating point operation in the
execution. The results are given in Figs. 10 and 11. Addition
also includes the running time of subtraction, because they
are implemented using the same protocol.Multiplication also
includes division by a public value for the same reason.
Whenwe compute collision probabilities using operations
based on Taylor series, we see that division and square root
are the most expensive operations, followed by the exponent
function and addition. Using Chebyshev polynomials greatly
reduces the importance of division and the exponent function,
leaving square root as the most time-consuming operation in
the algorithm.
8 Conclusions and further work
In this paper, we showed how to perform satellite colli-
sion analysis in a secure multiparty setting. For this pur-
pose, we first presented routines for implementing floating
point arithmetic operations on top of a SMC engine. The
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Fig. 10 Breakdown of secure floating point operation runtime in collision analysis with Taylor series
Fig. 11 Breakdown of secure floating point operation runtime in collision analysis with Chebyshev polynomials
general approach is generic, but in order to obtain the effi-
cient real implementation, platform-specific design decisions
have been made. In the current paper, we based our decisions
on the architecture of Sharemind which served as a basic
platform for our benchmarks. We also showed how to imple-
ment several elementary functions and benchmarked their
performance. However, by replacing the specific optimiza-
tions with generic algorithms or other specific optimizations,
these floating point algorithms can be ported to other secure
computation systems. We concluded by implementing the
algorithm for computing the probability of satellite collision
and benchmarked the performance of this implementation.
The largest impact of this work is the conclusion that it is
possible and feasible to perform satellite collision analysis
in a privacy-preserving manner.
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